North Korea/

North Korea, one of the world’s most centrally directed and least open economies, faces chronic economic problems. Industrial capital stock is nearly beyond repair as a result of years of underinvestment and shortages of spare parts. Large-scale military spending draws off resources needed for investment and civilian consumption. Industrial and power output have declined in parallel from pre-1990 levels. Severe flooding in the summer of 2007 aggravated chronic food shortages caused by on-going systemic problems, including a lack of arable land, collective farming practices, and persistent shortages of tractors and fuel. Large-scale international food aid deliveries have allowed the people of North Korea to escape widespread starvation since famine threatened in 1995, but the population continues to suffer from prolonged malnutrition and poor living conditions. Since 2002, the government has allowed private “farmers’ markets” to begin selling a wider range of goods. It also permitted some private farming - on an experimental basis - in an effort to boost agricultural output. In October 2005, the government tried to reverse some of these policies by forbidding private sales of grains and reinstituting a centralized food rationing system. By December 2005, the government terminated most international humanitarian assistance operations in North Korea (calling instead for developmental assistance only) and restricted the activities of remaining international and non-governmental aid organizations. In mid-2008, North Korea began receiving food aid under a US program to deliver 500,000 metric tons of food via the World Food Program and US nongovernmental organizations; but Pyongyang stopped accepting the aid in March 2009. In December 2009, North Korea carried out a redenomination of its currency, capping the amount of North Korean won that could be exchanged for the new notes, and limiting the exchange to a one-week window. A concurrent crackdown on markets and foreign currency use yielded severe shortages and inflation, forcing Pyongyang to ease the restrictions by February 2010. Nevertheless, firm political control remains the Communist government’s overriding concern, which likely will inhibit changes to North Korea’s current economic system.

$40 billion (2009 est.)

$40 billion (2008 est.)

North Korea does not publish reliable National Income Accounts data; the data shown here are derived from purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP estimates for North Korea that were made by Angus MADDISON in a study conducted for the OECD; his figure for 1999 was extrapolated to 2009 using estimated real growth rates for North Korea’s GDP and an inflation factor based on the US GDP deflator; the results were rounded to the nearest $10 billion.

$28 billion (2009 est.)

-0.9% (2009 est.)

3.7% (2008 est.)

$1,800 (2009 est.)

$1,900 (2008 est.)

12.2 million

NA%

NA%

NA%

rice, corn, potatoes, soybeans, pulses; cattle, pigs, pork, eggs

military products; machine building, electric power, chemicals; mining (coal, iron ore, limestone, magnesite, graphite, copper, zinc, lead, and precious metals), metallurgy; textiles, food processing; tourism

NA%

22.5 billion kWh (2008 est.)

18.8 billion kWh (2008 est.)

0 kWh (2008 est.)

0 kWh (2008 est.)

118 bbl/day (2009 est.)

16,000 bbl/day (2009 est.)

0 bbl/day (2007 est.)

13,890 bbl/day (2007 est.)

0 bbl (1 January 2010 est.)

0 cu m (2008 est.)

0 cu m (2008 est.)

0 cu m (2008 est.)

0 cu m (2008 est.)

0 cu m (1 January 2010 est.)

$1.997 billion (2009)

$2.062 billion (2008)

minerals, metallurgical products, manufactures (including armaments), textiles, agricultural and fishery products

China 42%, South Korea 38%, India 5% (2008)

$3.096 billion (2009)

$3.574 billion (2008)

petroleum, coking coal, machinery and equipment, textiles, grain

China 57%, South Korea 25%, Russia 3%, Singapore 3% (2008)

$12.5 billion (2001 est.)

North Korean won (KPW) per US dollar (market rate) 1,800 (December 2010), 3,630 (December 2008), 140 (2007), 141 (2006)